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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to propose a heterogeneous agent model
of stock markets that develop complicated endogenous price fluctu-
ations. We find occurrences of non-stationary chaos, or speculative
bubble, are caused by the heterogeneity of traders’ strategies. Fur-
thermore, we show that the distributions of returns generated from
the heterogeneous agent model have fat tails, a remarkable stylized
fact observed in almost all financial markets.
Key words: heterogeneous interacting agents, non-stationary
chaos, speculative bubbles, leptokurtosis, fat tails
1 Introduction
During the past decade, the dynamics of financial asset prices resulting from
interaction of heterogeneous agents have become of increasing interest. For
example, these price dynamics have been studied Arthur et al. (1997), Brock
and Hommes (1997, 1998), Chen and Yeh (2001), Chiarella (1992), Chiarella
and He (1999), Chiarella et al. (2001), Day and Huang (1990), De Grauwe
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†Division of Social Science, International Christian University, Osawa, Mitaka, Tokyo,
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et al. (1993), Farmer (2000), Frankel and Froot (1988), Kirman (1991, 1993)
and Lux (1995, 1998), Brock, Hommes and Wagener (2001), Gaunersdorfer
and Hommes (2000), Kirman and Teyssiere (1998), LeBaron et al. (1999),
Lux and Marchesi (1999, 2000) and Youssefmir and Huberman (1997)). How-
ever, surprisingly few studies so far have tried to explain prolonged rises in
asset prices, known as speculative bubbles, due to interaction of heteroge-
neous agents with different trading strategies and expectations. In contrast,
a large number of both theoretical and empirical studies has been made on
rational bubbles since Blanchard first proposed this idea in 1979. The aim
of this paper is to propose a heterogeneous-agent model that can generate
speculative bubbles as a result of the interaction of heterogeneous agents.
The theoretical set-up of the model presented here resembles that of previ-
ous works in many respects. We think of stock markets as consisting of a
market maker who mediates the trading and generates the market-clearing
price, and three typical types of traders that can be observed in financial
practice1: fundamentalists who believe that the asset price will return to the
fundamental price, chartists who base their trading decisions on an analy-
sis of past price-trends, and noise traders who base their trading decisions
on noisy information. Traders choose their trading strategy depending on
the degree of accuracy of the price prediction. Our model differs from pre-
vious works in that the traders’ excess demand functions for stock, which
are derived from utility maximization, have lower but no upper limits. We
demonstrate that this feature is an important factor in speculative bubbles.
In particular, we derive the following results:
1. When the non-linearity of the excess demand functions is sufficiently
strong, a speculative bubble or non-stationary chaos will be observed;
that is, irregular fluctuations of the asset price around an upward price
trend appear.
2. When speculative bubbles occur in the stock market, irrational traders,
namely, the chartists and noise traders, will drive out of the market
rational traders, namely the fundamentalists.
3. A fat-tailed distribution of the relative stock price change appears.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Chapter 2 presents the hetero-
geneous interacting agent model. Chapter 3 investigates the local and global
properties of the deterministic dynamics in the model, and explains why
speculative bubbles occur. Chapter 4 shows bubbles of stochastic dynamics
1These three different classes of traders are often used in the finance literature on
heterogeneous-agent systems.
and the fat tailed distribution of returns generated from the model. Chapter
5 gives brief concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Let us consider a simple stock market with the following characteristics.
A large amount of stock is traded. In the market, there are three typical
groups of traders with different strategies: fundamentalists, chartists, and
noise traders. Traders can invest either in money or in stock. Since the
model is designed to describe stock price movements over short periods, such
as one day, the dividend from stock and the interest rate for the risk-free asset
will be omitted for simplicity. Traders are myopic and bent on maximizing
utility. Their utility depends on the price change they expect, and on their
excess demand for stock rather than simply their demand. Their excess
demand is derived from utility maximization. What follows is a more precise
account of the decision making of each trader type.
2.1 Fundamentalists
Let Y ft be the amount of money that a fundamentalist holds at time t and
let Xft be the number of shares purchased by a fundamentalist at time t. Let
pt be the price per share of stock at time t. The fundamentalist’s budget
constraint is given by
Y ft + ptX
f
t = Y
f
t−1 + ptX
f
t−1,
or equivalently
yft + ptx
f
t = 0, (1)
where yft = (Y
f
t − Y ft−1) denotes the fundamentalist’s excess demand for
money, and xft = (X
f
t −Xft−1) his excess demand for stock. Suppose that the
fundamentalist’s preferences are represented by the utility function,
u = α(yft + p
f
t+1x
f
t ) + βx
f
t − (1 + βxft ) log(1 + βxft ), α > 0, β > 0, (2)
where pft+1 denotes the fundamentalist’s expectation in period t about the
price in the following period t + 1. The parameters α and β are assumed to
be positive. Inserting (1) into (2) the fundamentalist’s utility maximization
problem becomes:
max
x
f
t
u = α(pft+1 − pt)xft + βxft − (1 + βxft ) log(1 + βxft ). (3)
The utility function u satisfies the standard properties: u′(|xf |t) > 0,
u′′(|xf |t) < 0 for all |xf |t ≤ |xf∗| where |xf∗| denotes the absolute value of xf
producing a maximum utility. Thus, the utility function is strictly concave.
It depends on the price change expected by fundamentalists (pft+1 − pt) as
well as the fundamentalist’s excess demand for stock xft . The first part
α(pft+1 − pt)xft implies that a rise in the expected price change increases his
utility. The remaining part expresses his attitude toward risk. Even if the
expected price change is positive, he does not want to invest his total wealth
in the stock, and vice versa. In this sense, fundamentalists are risk averse.
β is the parameter that sets the lower limitation on excess demand. All
excess demand for stock derived from the utility maximization is limited to
−1/β. When the expected price change (pft+1− pt) is positive, the maximum
value of the utility function is also positive. This means that fundamentalists
try to buy stock. By analogy, when the expected price change (pft+1 − pt) is
negative, the maximum value of the utility function is negative, which means
that they try to sell. The utility maximization problem (3) is solved for the
fundamentalist’s excess demand,
xft =
1
β
(exp(
α(pft+1 − pt)
β
)− 1). (4)
Excess demand increases as the expected price change (pft,t+1 − pt) in-
creases. It should be noticed that the optimal value of excess supply is
limited to −1/β, while the optimal value of excess demand is not restricted.
Since there is little loss of generality in fixing the parameter β at unity, below,
we will assume β to be constant and equal to 1.
Then let us think of the fundamentalist’s expectation formation. We
assume that he form his price expectation according to a simple adaptive
scheme:
pft+1 = pt + ν(p
∗ − pt). (5)
We see from Equation (5) that fundamentalists believe that the price
moves towards the fundamental price p∗ by factor ν. To sum up fundamen-
talists’ behavior: if the price pt is below their expected price, they will try to
buy stock, because they consider the stock to be undervalued. On the con-
trary, if the price is above the expected value, they will try to sell, because
they consider the stock to be overvalued.
2.2 Chartists
Chartists are assumed to have the same utility function as the fundamental-
ists (2). Their behavior is formalized as maximizing the utility function
v = α(yt + p
c
t+1x
c
t) + βx
c
t − (1 + βxct) log(1 + βxct) (6)
subject to the budget constraint
yct + ptx
c
t = 0 (7)
where xct and y
c
t represent the chartist’s excess demand for stock and for
money at period t, and pct+1 denotes the price expected by him. The chartist’s
excess demand function for the stock is given by
xct =
1
β
(exp(
α(pet+1 − pt)
β
)− 1). (8)
His expectation formation is as follows: He is assumed to forecast the
future price pct+1 using adaptive expectations,
pct+1 = p
c
t + µ(pt − pct), (9)
where the parameter µ(0 < µ < 1) is a so-called error correction coeffi-
cient2. It follows that chartists try to buy stock when they anticipate a rising
price for the next period, and, in contrast, try to sell stock when they expect
a falling price.
2.3 Noise traders
Finally, let us consider the noise traders’ decision making. They are assumed
to base decisions on noise in the sense of a large number of small events 3.
The behavior of a noise trader can be formalized as maximizing the quadratic
utility function
W (xnt , y
n
t ) = g(y
n
t + (pt + ǫt)x
n
t )− k(xnt )2 (10)
subject to the budget constraint
2The excess demand for chartists exp(β(pe
t+1−pt))−1 is rewritten as exp(β(1−mu)(pet−
pt))− 1 under adaptive expectations. Hence, chartists’ decisions are based on observation
of the past price-data. This type of trader, who simply extrapolates patterns of past prices,
is a common stylized example, currently in popular use in heterogeneous agent models (cf.
Frankel and Froot (1988) and Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), and Gaunersdorfer and
Hommes (2000)).
3For the meaning of noise in financial markets, see Black (1986).
ynt + ptx
n
t = 0
where xnt and y
n
t represent the noise trader’s excess demand for stock
and for money at time t, respectively. The noise ǫt is assumed to be an IID
random variable. The excess demand function for stock is given as
xnt = γǫt, γ =
g
2k
> 0 (11)
where γ denotes the strength of the reaction to noisy information. In
short, noise traders try to buy stock if they believe the noise to be good news
(ǫt > 0). Inversely, if they believe the noise to be bad news (ǫt < 0), they try
to sell it.
2.4 The adjustment process of the price
Let us leave traders’ decision-making processes and turn to the adjustment
of the stock-market price. We assume the existence of a market maker, such
as a specialist in the New York stock exchange. The role of the market maker
is to give an execution price to incoming orders and to execute transactions4.
The market maker announces a price at the beginning of each trading
period. Traders then determine their excess demand, based on the announced
price and on their expected prices. When the market maker observes either
excess demand or excess supply, he applies the so-called short-side rule to
the demands and supplies, taking aggregate transactions for the stock to
be equal to the minimum of total supply and demand5. Thus traders on
the short side of the market will realize their desired transactions. At the
beginning of the next trading period, he announces a new price. If the excess
demand in period t is positive (negative), the market maker raises (reduces)
the price for the following period t+ 1. The process then is repeated. Let κ
and ξ be the fractions of chartists and of noise traders in the total number
of traders, respectively. Then the process of price adjustment can be written
as
4We don’t broach the issue of the market maker’s own trading activity because to
pursue this would take us beyond the scope of this paper. A heterogeneous agent model
that contains a specialist as a market participant has been proposed by Ready (1999).
Extension of our model to allow for the market maker’s own trading activity is a possible
direction for future research.
5The short side of a market is that where the aggregate volume of desired transactions
is smallest: the demand side if there is excess supply, the supply side if there is excess
demand.
pt+1 − pt = θn[(1− κ− ξ)xft + κxct + ξxnt ], (12)
where θ denotes the speed of the adjustment of the price, and n the total
number of traders.
2.5 Strategy switching
Interesting questions are whether the rational traders (fundamentalists) will
drive irrational traders (chartists and noise traders) out of the market, or
whether the irrational traders (chartists and noise traders) will derive the
rational traders (fundamentalists) out of the market. As in many studies
on heterogeneous interacting agent models (cf. Brock and Hommes (1997,
1998) and Lux (1998)), it may seem natural that switching between differ-
ent trading strategies plays an important role. In this subsection, we ask
the question how a trader makes his choice between the fundamentalist and
chartist strategies. The basic idea is that he chooses according to the accu-
racy of prediction. More precisely, we propose that the proportion of chartists
κt is updated according to the difference between the squared prediction er-
rors of each strategy. Formally, we write the dynamics of the proportion of
chartists κ as
κt =
(1− ξ)
1 + exp(ψ(Ect − Eft ))
, (13)
Ect = (pt − pct)2, Eft = (pt − pft )2,
where ψ measures how sensitively the mass of traders selects the optimal
prediction strategy at period t. Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) introduced
this parameter ψ as the intensity of choice to switch trading strategies. Equa-
tion (13) shows that if the chartists’ squared prediction error Ect is smaller
than that of fundamentalists Eft , some fraction of fundamentalists will be-
come chartists, and visa versa.
3 Deterministic Dynamics
The aim of this section is to describe the dynamic behavior of the model. In
particular, we will indicate local and global properties of the deterministic
dynamics when the parameter α is allowed to vary. α measures the strength
of the non-linearity of the excess demand functions. Substituting (4), (5),
(8), (9) and (11) to (12), the model can be rewritten as
pt+1 = pt+θn[(1−κt−ξ)(exp(αν(p∗−pt))−1)+κt(exp(α(1−µ)(pct−pt))−1)+ξγǫt],
pft+1 = pt + ν(p
∗ − pt),
pct+1 = p
c
t + µ(pt − pct), (14)
where
κt =
1
1 + exp(ψ((pt − pct)2 − (pt − pft )2))
.
The first of the equations above represents the adjustment of the price
performed by the market maker. The second and third equations show
the formation of the expectations of fundamentalists and chartists, respec-
tively. The fourth equation represents the movement of the chartist frac-
tion. Throughout this section, we assume that there exists no noise traders
(ξ = 0). Thus, the dynamics of the system (14) is deterministic. As can
be checked easily, the dynamic system (14) has as an unique fixed point:
P ≡ (p¯, p¯f , p¯c) = (p∗, p∗, p∗).
3.1 The local stability conditions
To investigate the dynamics of the model, we shall first determine the local
stability region of the unique equilibrium point P . The local stability analysis
of the equilibrium point P is performed via evaluation of the three eigenvalues
of the Jacobian matrix (14) at P . Let us denote by
c(λ) = λ3 − Tλ2 +Dλ (15)
the associated characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian matrix at P ,
where D = (2−µ−0.5θnα(1−µ+ν)) and T = (1−µ−0.5θnα(1+ν)(1−µ)).
An eigenvalue of the Jacobian is 0, and the other roots λ1 and λ2, satisfy the
relation
λ2 − Tλ+D = 0. (16)
Thus, the stability of the equilibrium point is determined by the absolute
values of λ1 and λ2. The eigenvalues λ1, λ2 are λ1,2 = T/2 +±
√
∆/2 where
∆ ≡ T 2 − 4D. As is well known, a sufficient condition for local stability
consists of the following inequalities: (i)1−T+D > 0, (ii) 1+T+D > 0, and
(iii) D < 1, giving necessary and sufficient conditions for the two eigenvalues
to be inside the unit circle of the complex plane. Elementary computations
lead to the condition:
α <
3− 2µ
θn(1 + ν − µ(1 + 0.5ν)) . (17)
The above local conditions demonstrate that while increasing α starting
from a sufficiently low value inside the stability region, a loss of local stability
of the equilibrium point P may occur via a flip bifurcation, when crossing
the curve
α =
3− 2µ
nθ(1 + ν − µ(1 + 0.5ν)) . (18)
3.2 Global bifurcations
What happens as α is further increased? We will see that first, a stable
2-cycle appears; secondly, the time path of the price diverges; and thirdly,
the time evolution of pt displays a remarkable transition from regular to
chaotic behavior around an upward time trend. It is important that the non-
stationary chaos can be transformed to a stationary series by differentiation
once ∆pt = pt−pt−1. The price series fluctuates irregularly around an upward
price trend, and the series of the price change fluctuates chaotically within a
finite interval. Below, this non-stationary chaotic pricing will be referred to
as a speculative bubble.
Let us look at these phenomena using the numerical simulation. In all
numerical simulations below, we will use a set of parameters given by
θ = 0.001, n = 1000, µ = ν = 0.5, γ = 1, p∗ = 100, ψ = 0.001.
(19)
Figure 1 shows a bifurcation diagram with the parameter α as the bi-
furcation parameter. The figure summarizes the long-run time evolution of
the price change ∆pt, for values of the parameter 3 < α < 7. By looking at
Figure 1, it is evident that the dynamic behavior starts from a stable point,
then goes through a sequence of period doubling bifurcations into a stable
cycle of periods 2, 4, 8, 16, ...,and so on. Then, the strange attractor set occurs
for values beyond the cycle of period three, which appears at about α = 6.
This bifurcation scenario to chaos is the familiar route to chaos, that is to
say, the Feigenbaum scenario.
(Figure 1 goes about here.)
3.3 Speculative bubbles
Why does a speculative bubble or non-stationary chaos appear when α in-
creases? Unfortunately, it is difficult to prove mathematically the existence
of the strange attractor. However, as we shall see, it is possible to give an
intuitive interpretation of speculative bubbles. To begin with, let us consider
why chaotic behavior of the price change is observed for large values of α.
Figure 2 indicates a phase plot (∆pt,∆pt+1) of the sequence of price change
∆pt for α = 5.5. The phase plot is constructed by iteration of 20000 times,
but here we use just the last 10000 iterations. A glance at Figure 2 shows a
fixed point on the phase curve, depicted as an intersection between the phase
curve and the 45-degree line6. As can be traced in this phase plot, a set of
states of ∆pt initially located close to the fixed point will first be stretched,
and then at some point will folded back on itself. This stretching and folding
is the root of the chaotic price behavior (For mathematical proof see Li and
York (1975), and Marotto (1978).).
(Figure 2 goes about here.)
The next question is why speculative bubbles occur when α is large. The
price adjustment equation suggests that a price trend can occur only when
excess demand aggregated over two types of traders is positive on average.
Why would average excess demand be positive as α become large? For an
answer, let us recall the traders’ excess-demand functions (4) and (8). xt
denotes the traders’ excess demand, and pet+1 denotes the expected price.
The partial derivative of the excess-demand function with respect to the
parameter α is obtained as
∂xt
∂α
= (pet+1 − pt) exp(α(pet+1 − pt)), (20)
where we assume β = 1. This equation suggests a rise in α increasing excess
demand exponentially, given the expected price change (pet+1 − pt) is posi-
tive. As shown in the preceding subsection, the maximum value of the excess
demand increases freely when α increases, while the maximum value of the
excess supply never can be lower than −1/β, regardless of the value of α.
Assume that, in the initial state, the price pt exceeds the fundamental price
p∗ in period t, and that the chartists forecast a rise over the next period. The
fundamentalists predict a falling price. Then, chartists try to buy and funda-
mentalists try to sell stock. When α is sufficiently large, one can safely state
that chartist excess demand will exceed fundamentalist excess supply. The
6We can also show that the phase curve is stretched upwards when α increases.
market maker observes excess demand, and raises the price for the following
period. If the rise is strong, chartists may predict a new rise, which provokes
yet another reaction of the market maker. Once the price deviates strongly
from the fundamental price, the fundamentalists become perpetual sellers
of stock, and when α is sufficiently large, the chartists’ excess demand may
begin to exceed the fundamentalists’ excess supply on average. Furthermore,
fundamentalists may be driven out of the market by evolutionary competi-
tion expressed by (13)7. It follows that when the value of α is sufficiently
large, average excess demand is positive and speculative bubbles occur.
4 Stochastic dynamics
To adjust the model to approximate real stock markets, we now assume the
existence of noise traders. Below, we set ξ = 0.3, i.e., 30 percent of the total
number of traders are noise traders. Figure 3a and Figure 3b indicate the
time series of the price and of the price change for α = 5.5, disturbed by
dynamic noise with ǫt ∼ N(0, 1). The figures show that the time series of
the price has an upward trend and that it fluctuates irregularly8. (Figure 3a
and Figure 3b go about here.)
4.1 Evolutionary competition
Another very interesting question is whether the irrational traders (chartists
and noise traders) can survive competition against the rational traders (fun-
damentalists), or whether the rational traders (fundamentalists) can survive
competition against the irrational traders (chartists and noise traders). Fig-
ure 4a illustrates the time series of the fraction of chartists κ for the param-
eters α = 4 and ξ = 0.3. The speculative bubble does not occur under this
set of parameters. Figure 9a shows that κt continues to fluctuate around
0.35. This means that, on average, the same number of fundamentalists and
chartists exists, and that the irrational traders will stay in the market for-
ever. On the other hand, Figure 4b shows the time series of the fraction of
chartists κt for the parameters α = 5 and ξ = 0.3. There occurs a speculative
bubble under this set of parameters. We see from Figure 9b that κt finally
converges to 0.7. This means that fundamentalists die out, and irrational
7In the following section, we shall be examining this subject.
8Many numerical simulations for various values of α and ξ suggest that the existence
of noise traders does not change essentially the properties of the price dynamics, such as
speculative bubbles.
traders survive competition. The reason is the speculative bubble caused by
the strong non-linearity of the excess-demand functions. When speculative
bubbles occur, the price continues to deviate from the fundamental price, so
that the prediction errors of the fundamentalists’ trading strategy increase
compared to those of the chartists’ trading strategy. Therefore, the number
of fundamentalists decreases and the number of chartists increases.
(Figure 4a and Figure 4b go about here.)
4.2 Fat tail phenomenon
A number of empirical studies have found that the empirical distributions of
returns in almost all financial data show an uni-modal bell shape, and possess
excessive fourth moments, so-called leptokurtosis, (cf. Pagan (1996)). Figure
5 is a histogram of the stock-return series 9 for α = 4. It is constructed
by 20000 iterations of the system (14) with α = 5.5. The shape of the his-
togram appears well behaved: an uni-modal bell-shape. Table 1 presents
sample statistics of the stock returns, which are based upon several series
of 20000 data points. The sixth and seventh columns denote the dynamic
properties of the price and the price change, respectively. The mean value
is very close to zero, and the standard deviation is small. The skewness is
positive, and the kurtosis is significantly positive. The important result is
that the histogram exhibits apparently more probability mass in the tails
and the centre than the standard Normal. Therefore, the time series of the
returns are leptokurtotic, i.e., possessing excessive fourth moments.
(Figure 5 goes about here.)
Table 1: Statistics of returns from artificial data
α Mean S.D. Skewness Kurtosis Price Return ρ
1 0 0.014 0.023 0.061 stable stable 4.83
2 0 0.016 0.210 0.323 stable stable 4.14
3 0 0.02 0.703 1.552 periodic periodic 3.2
4 0 0.026 1.411 4.277 periodic periodic 2.32
5 0 0.004 2.963 17.605 bubble chaotic 4.58
9Returns are defined as rt = log pt+1 − log pt.
However, the kurtosis is a relatively limited measure of deviation for Gaus-
sian statistics. Recent literature finds that the distribution of returns is not
only leptokurtotic, but also belongs to the class of fat-tailed distributions.
This finding is generally accepted as a universal characteristic of practically
all financial returns. More formally, it has been shown that the tails of the
distribution of returns follow approximately a power law:
F (|zt| > x) ∼ cx−ρ (21)
where the function F denotes the cumulative probability distribution of
the normalized stock returns and ρ is called tail index. We normalized the
stock returns,
zt =
(rt − 〈rt〉)
υ
(22)
where 〈rt〉 denotes the time average and υ denotes the standard deviation.
The last column of Table 1 shows the values of the tail index ρ for tail
sizes up to 5 percent of the size of the return series generated from our
model under various values of α10. Most empirical studies show estimates
of ρ falling in the range of 2 to 4 (cf. Pagan (1996), Gopikrishnan et al.
(1998)). In Table 1 the values of ρ range between 2 and 4, as long as periodic
solutions of the price are observed. Thus, we find a power-law behavior for
the cumulative distribution of the stock returns with ρ well outside the Levy
regime (0 < ρ < 2). Consequently, the time series of the returns generated
from the above artificial stock market share this remarkable feature of actual
data from stock markets.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we proposed a heterogeneous interacting agent model for stock
markets. It generates three important findings: (1) the non-linearity of the
excess demand functions derived from the traders’ optimization behavior
might generate speculative bubbles; (2) fundamentalists may be driven out of
the market by irrational traders, such as chartists and noise traders, provided
a speculative bubble occurs; and (3) the return distributions derived from
the model have fat tails, an important characteristic of empirical financial
data which is observed in almost all financial markets. There are, however,
remarkable differences between the time series generated by our model and
actual financial data. For example, the noisy time series of the price change
10The values of ρ are computed by the Hill tail index estimate, which is a standard
working tool for estimations of the Pareto exponent of the tails.
(Figure 3b) has strongly significant autocorrelations at the first two lags (0.5
and 0.1), whereas in reality the series of price changes or returns have almost
no significant autocorrelations at any lags. Furthermore, the returns series
generated by the model exhibit no volatility clustering, which is a universal
property of real returns series. Apparently, our model is too simple to explain
all stylized facts of real financial data at the same time and, thus, needs to
be further developed. This we leave to future work.
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Figure 1: The bifurcation diagram of the stock return when the parameter
α varies smoothly from 3 to 7. The other parameter values: θ = 0.001,
n = 1000, µ = ν = 0.5, γ = 1, p∗ = 100, ψ = 0.001, and ξ = 0.
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Figure 2: A phase plot (∆pt,∆pt−1) of the sequence of price change ∆pt
generated for α = 5.5. The other parameter values are: θ = 0.001, n = 1000,
µ = ν = 0.5, γ = 1, p∗ = 100, ψ = 0.001, and ξ = 0.
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Figure 3: (a) The time series of the price for α = 5.5, buffeted with dynamic
noise with ǫ ∼ N(0, 1). The other parameter values are: θ = 0.001, n = 1000,
µ = ν = 0.5, γ = 1, p∗ = 100, ψ = 0.001, and ξ = 0.3. (b) The time series of
the price change for α = 5.5, buffeted with dynamic noise with ǫ ∼ N(0, 1).
The other parameter values are: θ = 0.001, n = 1000, µ = ν = 0.5, γ = 1,
p∗ = 100, ψ = 0.001, and ξ = 0.3.
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Figure 4: (a) The time-series plots of the fraction of the chartists κ for the
parameters α = 4 and ξ = 0.2. The other parameter values are: θ = 0.001,
n = 1000, µ = ν = 0.5, γ = 1, p∗ = 100, ψ = 0.001, and ξ = 0.3. (b) The
time series plots of the fraction of the chartists κ for the parameters α = 5
and ξ = 0.3. The other parameter values: θ = 0.001, n = 1000, µ = ν = 0.5,
γ = 1, p∗ = 100, ψ = 0.001, and ξ = 0.3.
00.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
-0.074 -0.029 0.015 0.060 0.104 0.149 0.193
Figure 5
Returns
The relative frequency
Figure 5: A histogram of returns generated from the time series of the
price for α = 5.5. The other parameter values are: θ = 0.001, n = 1000,
µ = ν = 0.5, γ = 1, p∗ = 100, ψ = 0.001, and ξ = 0.3.
